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 When Richard Martin 1 was a teenager, he ran away from an abusive home. 
A 46-year-old man took him in, and repeatedly drugged and raped him. 
When Richard was 16, his abuser told him to kill a man and steal a truck. 
He did so. Three weeks later, Richard brought himself to a police station 
and confessed. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison 
with the possibility of parole. A sentence of life with the possibility of parole 
(“term-to-life” sentence) means that Richard had to serve a set number of 
years in prison, after which he became eligible for a hearing in which a 
parole board could grant or deny release on parole. Unlike most states, 
California recognizes a legal presumption in favor of granting release on 
parole which can be defeated by some evidence that a person poses a current 
danger. The parole board decided to approve Richard for release on three 
separate occasions, and each time the decision was reversed. 
 In 2013, California passed Senate Bill 260, a statute requiring that parole 
hearings be a “meaningful opportunity for release” for people who commit-
ted crimes at a young age. The law essentially put a thumb on the scale in 
favor of release at youthful offender parole hearings. Over 250 people have 
been released from prison under this law to date, and it was expected that 
Richard would be among them ( Kuznia 2016 ). Despite the fact that Richard 
has a clean record in prison and has engaged in almost all the rehabilita-
tion programs that the prison has to offer, the parole board again denied 
his release. A commissioner on the parole board felt that Richard was not 
enthusiastically participating in the process of answering their questions. 
 As of this writing, Richard is 55 years old and remains incarcerated in 
a California State Prison. He struggles with depression; as he has told the 
parole board, he has lost faith in the process. 
 Richard’s story is not unique, a number of similar stories are chronicled 
in “False Hope,” a report by the American Civil Liberties Union that details 
the broken nature of the parole-release process across the nation (Mehta 
2016). In California, one-third of the entire prison population is serving a 
term-to-life sentence (“lifers”), meaning they will die in prison unless the 
parole board approves their release (Nellis 2013). Across the nation, over 
110,000 people are serving term-to-life sentences ( Nellis 2013 : 6). “The 
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number of people serving life sentences has more than quadrupled since 
1984—a faster rate of growth than the overall prison population.” ( Ghand-
noosh 2017 : 3). Procedural protections at parole hearings are minimal and 
variable (Ruhland et al. 2016: 23), as is the rate at which parole boards 
approve prisoners for release (Mehta 2016;  Schwartzapfel 2015 ). In Cali-
fornia, for example, the parole board granted parole in approximately 27% 
of all the lifer parole hearings that it conducted in 2015, but almost no one 
was released under the reign of Governor Gray Davis in 1999–2003 ( Board 
of Parole Hearings 2015 ;  Kobrin 2005 ; Weisberg 2011: 15). In Florida, 
the parole grant rate is less than one percent, and in Ohio the grant rate 
ranges between four percent and nine percent (Mehta 2016: 46). In stark 
contrast, the Arkansas parole board granted parole in 71 percent of the 
cases it reviewed in 2015 ( Mehta 2016 ). 
 Many state parole boards also have release authority over hundreds of 
thousands of prisoners who are serving sentences that are shorter than 
term-to-life (Ruhland et al. 2016: 14). In non-term-to-life cases that go 
before the parole board, people are generally serving sentences within a 
range fi xed by a judge (for example, 7–10 years), and the parole board 
decides on a release date at some point within that range. The rate at which 
parole boards release people before the maximum date of their term is gen-
erally higher than the rate of release in term-to-life cases. For example, the 
Georgia parole board approved release for 11 percent of people serving 
term-to-life sentences, but its general grant rate (including non-life sen-
tences) was 56 percent ( Mehta 2016 : 47). Of note, however, research from 
one state shows that the parole grant rate among non-life sentences is dis-
parate across racial lines: a study of the general parole grant rate in New 
York State in 2013–2016 showed a release rate of 25% for white prisoners 
and 15% for African American prisoners (Winerip 2016). An older study of 
the New York parole system found that the variability and unpredictability 
of parole-release decisions increased as the severity of the crime increased 
( Vera Institute of Justice 1978 ). 
 The arbitrary and politicized nature of parole-release systems is an 
easy target to criticize, but proposals for effective reform are few and far 
between. Some consider reform hopeless and have advocated for abolishing 
parole-release systems in favor of sentences with pre-determined end dates 
and specifi c good-time reduction credits ( American Bar Association 1994 ). 
The federal government and several states abolished or otherwise con-
tracted parole-release systems in the 1970s through the 1990s ( Rhine 2012 : 
631–632), but many of these jurisdictions have seen increases in the amount 
of time that people serve in prison and little (if any) improvement in the fair-
ness of sentencing (Nellis 2013). In Louisiana, for example, people serving 
term-to-life sentences in prison used to be regularly released on parole after 
having served a decade in prison, but after the abolition of parole-release, 
4,657 people are now serving life without the possibility of parole sentences 
(11% of Louisiana’s prison population). Of those 4,657 people, 73.4% are 
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African American ( Nellis 2013 ). In recent years, states that had previously 
contracted parole-release systems are once again expanding them (Ruhland 
et al. 2016: 15). 
 In 2016 and 2017, advocates and scholars have proposed several rec-
ommendations for meaningful reform of the parole-release process ( Mehta 
2016 ; Rhine 2017;  Ghandnoosh 2017 ). A primary objective of the recom-
mendations is to curtail discretion in parole-release decisions; as one expert 
has said, parole-release decisions have long been the most visible display 
of discretion in the criminal justice system ( Rhine 2012 ). To reduce arbi-
trary decision making, the recommendations propose depoliticizing parole 
boards, reducing the amount of time served before the fi rst parole hearing, 
increasing procedural protections at hearings, and establishing a strong pre-
sumption in favor of release. 
 Left largely unexplored, however, is the normative project of analyzing 
what substantive criteria ought to guide parole-release decisions. I under-
take this normative project here, reviewing how four different moral theo-
ries of punishment would structure parole-release criteria. I consider two 
general objections to each of these approaches, and then turn to draw les-
sons from how one state’s parole-release system functions in practice. Learn-
ing from both the theoretical and practical perspectives on the question of 
parole-release criteria, I suggest that a fundamentally different approach to 
parole-release criteria is required. I propose a “reparative approach” that 
builds on aspects of restorative justice and takes seriously respect for the 
moral agency of prisoners, victims, and the broader political community. 
 Four Theoretical Approaches to Parole-Release 
Decision Criteria 
 In this section, I describe the approach to parole-release decision criteria 
from the perspective of four received theories of punishment: a retributive 
theory, deterrence theory, rehabilitation theory, and communicative theory. 
I do not sketch multifaceted policy proposals, but seek only to identify the 
basic decision-release criteria that are grounded in the core commitments of 
these theories of punishment. 
 Although the four theories of punishment I consider purport to provide 
a moral justifi cation of punishment, it is an open question whether any of 
them actually justify the contemporary practice of term-to-life sentences or 
other prison sentences with the option of parole-release. I do not address 
the moral justifi ability of such sentences here, but assume for the purpose 
of the paper that they are a relatively fi xed point in the American landscape 
for the foreseeable future. The project here is to identify what guidance (if 
any) these theories of punishment can provide in the design of parole-release 
decision criteria. I aim to be ecumenical regarding theories of punishment in 
this paper; that is, I do not herein object to any of the theories themselves. 
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I argue in the next section, however, that each of the parole-release decision 
criteria are objectionable on two basic grounds. 
 In focusing on how different theories of  punishment would inform 
parole-release decision criteria, I am suggesting that the central question in 
making a parole-release decision is when and whether  punishment should 
end. The central question, however, may be considerably more complex, 
depending on how one conceives of punishment and the function of parole. 2 
Arguably, punishment does not end when a person is released on parole. 
When a person is granted release on parole, she is placed under state super-
vision and instructed to abide by a specifi c set of parole terms. If she is found 
to be in violation of those terms, she is returned to prison on her original 
sentence. The central inquiry of the parole-release decision thus may not be 
whether punishment should cease, but rather whether punishment should 
occur in the community rather than in the prison. Research on this ques-
tion is critical, but I save it for future work. For the purpose of this paper, 
I assume that a full normative account of parole will need to address the 
question of when and whether punishment should end, and I consider that 
question from the perspective of four received views of punishment. 
 Retribution . The core commitment of a retributive theory is that punish-
ment is morally justifi ed on the basis of the principle that people who com-
mit crimes deserve to suffer in proportion to the gravity of the crime. Given 
that the amount of punishment is keyed to the gravity of the crime—which 
is known at the time of conviction—retributivists have reason to favor 
determination of sentence lengths at the time of conviction. For various 
reasons, retributivists tend to favor sentences that cover a general range of 
time (for example, 7–10 years) rather than a specifi c time period. Within the 
range of time, a retributivist may favor basing parole-release decisions on a 
variety of factors that are morally relevant, but not grounded in retributiv-
ism; for example, by an assessment of dangerousness, by employment skills, 
or by the needs of dependent family members who need the prisoner to take 
care of them. 
 If pressed to identify release criteria that are grounded in the core com-
mitments of retributive theory, a theorist would have (at least) two options. 
First, a retributivist could base release decisions on whether a person has 
actually experienced an amount of suffering that is proportional to the grav-
ity of the crime. The amount of actual suffering that individuals experience 
from the same length of incarceration varies considerably due to differences 
in conditions of confi nement as well as people’s individual characteristics. 
A person who has actually experienced more suffering compared to others 
convicted of a similarly grave crime would have grounds for release earlier 
within the sentencing range. 
 A second parole-release criterion based in retributive theory concerns 
transformational change in the person who committed the crime. Some 
retributivists maintain that the fi ttingness of a punishment to a given crime 
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loses its grip if the person who committed the crime undergoes a deep 
change in character. The person who committed the crime deserves punish-
ment because she stands behind the crime, or is committed to the moral 
view that the crime expressed. If a person changes over time and continually 
separates herself from the crime as a reprehensible action which she deeply 
regrets, she no longer stands behind the crime and it may no longer makes 
sense for her to be punished for it ( Hampton 1988 : 154). A person who 
demonstrates this change would have grounds for release earlier within the 
sentencing range. 
Communicative . The core insights of a communicative theory of punish-
ment are that (i) political communities ought to communicate condemna-
tion of crime in order to express the wrongness of criminal actions, (ii) 
punishment communicates such condemnation, and (iii) insofar as criminal 
punishment is morally justifi ed, its justifi cation relies to some degree on 
the aim of punishment to express condemnation. 3 A communicative theory, 
like a retributive theory, may rely on criteria for parole-release decisions 
that are exogenous to the communicative aim. If pressed to develop criteria 
within the theory, a natural criterion for a communicative theorist would be 
whether a perpetrator has understood and recognized the community’s mes-
sage about the wrongness of her past criminal conduct. This would include 
understanding both  that the violation is wrong and  why it is wrong, and 
embracing a commitment to abide by the law in the future not (only) as a 
prudential matter, but as a matter of what is owed to the community ( Duff 
2011 : 373). 
 Parole boards might seek to answer the central inquiry by prompting a 
person to explain how the crime happened, why she did it, and inviting her 
to express her current perspective on the action. The parole board might 
also look to whether the person has done her best to understand the atti-
tudes or values that led them to her crime, and to explain what she has done 
to change those attitudes. In grave crimes, the parole board may consider 
whether a person has taken action to make amends (for example, paying 
restitution, fundraising for charities, repairing relationships, etc.) as a way 
of showing that she fully understands the depth of her wrongdoing. 
 Deterrence . The core claim of a general deterrence-based theory of pun-
ishment is that punishment is justifi ed when (and if) punishing people for 
crime is an effective method of reducing or preventing crime in the com-
munity. Deterrence theorists take punishment to be justifi ed only up to the 
point where resources used on punishment return greater crime-reduction 
outcomes compared to alternatives. A deterrence theorist would base release 
decisions on a utility function that is sensitive to factors including crime 
rates, economic incentives for committing crimes, public perception of the 
harshness of punishment, cost of incarceration, and predictions of how a 
person will behave upon release. A person would be released from prison 
when the utility function indicates that the cost of incarcerating a person 
would have smaller public safety benefi ts than releasing the person. 
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 Some deterrence theorists are less interested in “general deterrence” 
(which purports to justify punishing a person in order to deter others from 
crime), and instead focus on “special deterrence” or “incapacitation” (which 
purports to justify punishing a person in order to prevent that person from 
committing crime in the community). On a theory of special deterrence, the 
parole board would not consider the full utility function, but limit itself to 
consideration of the probability that a person would commit a future crime 
if released. A person would be released if the probability falls below a given 
benchmark. The theory itself does not settle what the benchmark should be. 
 Of note, some have proposed grounding parole-release decisions in a 
mixed view of retribution and special deterrence (Rhine et al. 2016: 14–17). 
Sentences would be structured such that there is a range of time that “fi ts” 
the crime, and release decisions within that range would be made on the 
basis of judgments about whether the individual is likely to commit another 
crime if released. 
Rehabilitation . A rehabilitation theory of punishment holds that punish-
ment is justifi ed only when (and if) punishing people for crime is an effective 
method of improving people’s ability to function as pro-social members of 
the community. Punishment in prison is thought to help people improve 
themselves, but after a certain point, improvement is better achieved out-
side of prison walls. On this view, a parole board ought to release an indi-
vidual at “just the right time” to help a person succeed in re-entering society. 
A person should not be released too early (i.e., when she would still benefi t 
more from time in prison), nor too late (i.e., when she would be stagnated 
by spending more time in prison). To determine “just the right time” for 
release, parole boards look to whether people have taken full advantage of 
rehabilitation programs available in the prison, to their re-entry options, 
and to the opinions of prison staff and psychologists. Of note, the rehabili-
tation framework was taken to be the theoretical underpinning of opera-
tive parole-release systems in the 1960s and 1970s, although it was unclear 
whether actual practice refl ected this ideal ( Rhine 2012 ). 
 Two General Objections 
 Each of the criteria described above is subject to (at least) two general types 
of objection. The fi rst type of objection concerns the limits on our ability to 
assess fairly or measure the various proposed criteria. The second concerns 
failure to respect the moral agency of people in prison. 
Limits on fair assessment . Given the nature of the criteria proposed by 
each of the four theories, we have limited ability to know whether or not 
the criteria are fulfi lled in any given case. The limitations on our knowledge 
are somewhat different for each theory. With respect to both the retributive 
and communicative theories, we are limited because we are not equipped to 
peer into a person’s psyche and discern whether she has undergone personal 
transformation and/or understood the depth of her wrongdoing. Outward 
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indicators like expressions of remorse, apology, and efforts toward amends 
can provide some evidence of transformation and/or understanding, but we 
have no mirror into a person’s authentic conscience ( Hampton 1988 ). 
 With respect to the deterrence and rehabilitation theories, we are limited 
because we lack a “crystal ball” that can predict a person’s future behavior 
upon release from prison. Actuarial risk assessment tools and expert opin-
ions of psychologists may provide estimated probabilities of whether a per-
son will commit a crime or improve herself if released from prison, but such 
estimates are not proof of future conduct. Early empirical studies of parole 
hearing decisions and recidivism underscore the point ( Scott 1974 ; Garber 
and Maslach 1977;  Carroll 1978 ; Holland 1978; Carroll et al. 1982). Con-
sider one study that compiled case summaries of 200 former parolees, half of 
whom violated parole and half of whom successfully completed parole and 
were discharged. Two groups of people—(i) experienced parole offi cers and 
(ii) accountants—were asked to read the case summaries and decide who 
would fail on parole and who would succeed. The parole offi cers did slightly 
worse than the accountants, and neither group made better predictions than 
would have resulted from chance alone (Garber and Maslach 1977: 264). 
Research in actuarial risk assessment tools have progressed since the time of 
that study, and parole boards are relying increasingly on these tools. (Ruh-
land et al. 2016). There is reason to believe that the accuracy of parole 
boards in making predictions about future conduct has improved and will 
continue to improve. Nevertheless it is unlikely that accuracy will rise to the 
level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 The problem with the inherent uncertainty in the criteria proposed by the 
four theories is not simply a lack of accuracy, but the fact that the uncer-
tainty invites decision makers to exercise idiosyncratic discretion that in 
turn engenders arbitrary decision making. Worse, given the nature of some 
of the criteria, the exercise of discretion will tend to disadvantage some 
prisoners relative to others on the basis of morally irrelevant factors. With 
respect to the retributive and communicative criteria, people will fare better 
at convincing decision makers of transformation and understanding if they 
are intelligent, understand the culture of the decision makers, and are skilled 
at comporting themselves and articulating themselves within that culture. 
People from linguistic and cultural minorities, people who have diffi culties 
in expressing themselves, and people with defi cits in understanding or in 
communicating complex ideas will tend to fare worse. With respect to deter-
rence and rehabilitation criteria that look to predictions of future conduct, 
people of color and people from poor, disadvantaged communities will tend 
to fare worse. Actuarial risk assessment tools tend to overestimate the level 
of risk they pose because they have fewer past indicators of stability (Larson 
et al. 2016). 
 Robust procedural protections might mitigate some of the unfairness 
here. But we should think twice about designing a system which relies on 
criteria that invite arbitrary decisions and unfairness from the outset. 
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Failure to Respect Moral Agency . Even if we could reliably and fairly 
measure each of the proposed criteria, there are deontic moral reasons to 
object to each of them. In different ways, each of the criteria fail to respect 
people in prison as moral agents—that is, as agents with the capacity to 
accept moral norms and values through their own judgment, and with the 
capacity to conform their actions to those norms and values. 
 Consider fi rst the deterrence view which involves conditioning release 
from prison on a prediction about whether a person will commit a crime in 
the future. Keeping a person in prison because a state offi cial has deemed it 
necessary to prevent her from responding to some imagined future stimuli 
treats her as an animal, not an autonomous agent equipped with the capac-
ity to understand moral reasons and make choices. To be clear, the problem 
is  not that acting on predictions about a person’s future conduct necessarily 
fails to respect that person’s agency. The problem is that the state is deter-
mining the harshness of criminal punishment—the amount of time a person 
spends locked up in a place overtly designed to set back the interests of 
culpable individuals—on the basis of a prediction about a person’s response 
to some imagined future stimuli. This treats a person as a dangerous, caged 
animal; not a person who is a co-member of the political community. 
 In a different way, the other three proposed criteria also fail to respect 
the moral agency of people in prison. Personal transformation, understand-
ing, and rehabilitation all include a person accepting norms and values for 
pro-social conduct in society. When the state conditions release from prison 
on acceptance of prevailing norms and values, it is not respecting a person’s 
status as an agent with the capacity to accept those norms on the basis of  her 
own judgment . Instead, the state is using the threat of prolonged incarcera-
tion to coerce a person into accepting those norms and values by force. Such 
use of force raises moral concern in two ways: fi rst, it is generally wrong 
to use force on a moral agent unless or until she changes her mental state. 
Doing so fails to respect her moral agency; in the words of Martin Luther 
King, this type of action is “immoral because it seeks to humiliate the oppo-
nent rather than win his understanding.” Second, it is generally wrong for 
the  state to so coerce a person because of limits on legitimate state authority. 
We recognize that such state coercion over the content of mental states is 
wrong as applied to free people, and the same principle ought to apply to 
people in prison ( Tadros 2011 : 355). 
 Given this concern, and the importance of respect for agency that both the 
retributive and communicative embrace, pure retributive and communica-
tive theorists may ultimately oppose the proposed criteria I sketched above. 
Most notably, a leading defender of communicative theory, Antony Duff, 
has made it clear that punishment “must seek to persuade ( but not to coerce 
or manipulate ) [a person convicted of a crime] to repent his crime and to 
accept his punishment as a penance for that crime,  while leaving him free to 
remain unpersuaded and unrepentant” ( Duff 2001 : 177, emphasis added.) 
Conditioning release from prison on adopting an attitude of understanding 
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would violate this principle. It may be that communicative and retributive 
theorists would ultimately favor the reparative approach that I describe at 
the end of this chapter, but the issue merits further thought into the weeds 
of these theories that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 The Practice of Making Parole Decisions 
 Having considered parole-release criteria from the perspective of four dif-
ferent theories of punishment, I now consider how one jurisdiction has 
implemented some of these criteria in the context of term-to-life sentences. 
I consider California because it has the third largest prison population in 
the country after the federal government and the state of Texas ( Carson 
2015 : 3), and the largest population of people serving term-to-life sentences 
(Ghandnoosh 2017). As of 2012, approximately one in three people in 
California prisons was serving a term-to-life sentence, meaning that they 
will die in prison unless the parole board fi nds them suitable for release 
on parole (Nellis 2013: 6). Parole is far from a guarantee for these prison-
ers; from 2000 to 2011, more prisoners serving life sentences for murder 
died in prison than were released on parole ( Mullane 2012 : 147). Although 
California has some of the most robust procedural protections at parole 
hearings compared to other states ( Mehta 2016 ), its parole-release grant 
rate nevertheless varies remarkably from one political regime to the next 
( Ghandnoosh 2017 : 16). Social scientists and legal commentators have writ-
ten a great deal about California’s parole process (for example,  Weisberg 
2011 ; Young 2016;  Caldwell 2016 ); my discussion here is limited to a brief 
summary of the legal framework and a critical evaluation of the underlying 
normative framework. 
 California law requires the parole board to grant parole unless it fi nds 
that a person poses an  unreasonable risk to public safety . The law’s sole 
focus on risk to public safety makes it appear that the California parole 
system is designed to operate under the “special deterrence” framework 
described above. After a person has served the minimum amount of time 
proportionate to her offense, she is to be released unless the parole board 
predicts that she will commit another crime or violate a term of parole if 
released ( In re Reed [2009] 171 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1081). If the board 
denies parole, it must exhaustively list its reasons for doing so and explain 
why there is evidence of current dangerousness. That evidence cannot rely 
solely on facts about the crime or a person’s history prior to the crime ( In 
re Lawrence [2008] 44 Cal.4th 1181). The facts of the crime and other past 
history can be included as evidence of current dangerousness, however, if 
there is a “rational nexus” between the crime and the person’s recent con-
duct or mental state ( In re Shaputis [2011] 53 Cal.4th 192, 218). 
 With this cursory description of the framework in place, I turn to describe 
three morally problematic features of the California parole process. First, as 
discussed above, grounding decisions on predictions about future conduct 
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fails to respect people as moral agents and invites a great deal of arbitrari-
ness into decisions. Of two people with similar case factors, one may be 
deemed dangerous and denied, whereas the other is deemed not dangerous 
and granted. Although the parole board states its reasons for every deci-
sion, the factors are so murky that the real reason behind a given denial are 
often left a mystery. What one prisoner said about the mysteriousness of the 
parole process in another state is equally true in some cases in California: 
“I feel like I am chasing a ghost” ( Mehta 2016 ). 
 Second, California’s focus on special deterrence at parole hearings is 
inconsistent with its concern for proportionate sentencing. California law 
recognizes a proportionality principle in that prisoners are required to serve 
a minimum number of years that is proportional to the crime before becom-
ing eligible for a parole hearing. But because current law does not recognize 
a ceiling on the maximum punishment (other than natural death), the system 
produces outcomes that are perverse from the perspective of proportionality. 
Consider two 18-year-old co-defendants who had equal culpability in com-
mitting a crime, and who were both given a sentence of 7-years-to-life. Sup-
pose one co-defendant was a smart, articulate prisoner who followed rules 
and was released on parole at age 25 after having served 7 years in prison. 
Suppose the second co-defendant is continually denied parole because she 
is frequently written up for non-serious violations of prison rules which the 
parole board believes to be correlated with a risk of recidivism. Suppose the 
second co-defendant dies in prison at age 68 after having served 50 years. 
She has served a sentence that is not only more than 7 times longer—but 
an  entire lifetime longer—for the very same crime. Given that the state has 
adopted a retributive principle as the reason to set a fl oor on the minimum 
punishment, it is inconsistent with that principle to permit such an extraor-
dinarily wide range of punishment without a ceiling. 
 Third, in practice, there is a gulf between the criterion that the law requires 
the parole board to use—whether or not a person will re-offend if released 
(special deterrence)—and the criteria that the parole board actually consid-
ers in exercising its discretion. As the following discussion shows, the board 
is strongly infl uenced by concerns apart from deterrence that are rooted in 
the retributive, rehabilitation, and communicative aspects of punishment. 
My discussion here is informed by several studies of California parole hear-
ings as well as reading transcripts from California parole hearings for peo-
ple serving life sentences for juvenile convictions ( Weisberg 2011 ; Young 
2016;  Caldwell 2016 ). 
 California lifer parole hearings are laden with expressions of condemna-
tion for the crime, and with questions about whether a person recognizes 
the depth of her wrongdoing. Questions about the crime and past criminal 
history often consume much of the hearing; in some cases, questions about 
a decades-old crime have lasted over three hours. Hearings close with a 
statement by the district attorney and the victim or victim’s next of kin (if 
they choose to make a statement) which are generally prolonged expressions 
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of condemnation. In addition, the parole board seeks to determine whether 
the prisoner has “gone deep” in taking personal responsibility understand-
ing her role in crime. If a person attributes the commission of her crime to 
“external factors” such as drug use and peer pressure within a street gang, 
the board is likely to think she is “minimizing” her own criminal mindset at 
the time. The board told one man that they wanted to hear him say he was 
“a monster” for having sold crack on a street corner at age 16 (transcript 
on fi le with author). The board regularly cites the heinousness of the crime, 
inadequacy of remorse, and insuffi cient change in attitude since the time of 
the crime as reasons to deny parole. The discourse is far closer to what you 
would expect to hear from a retributivist or a communicative theorist (or a 
hard-nosed priest and a penitent in a confessional) than it is to a collection 
of data points on predicting future conduct. 
 The parole board also spends roughly 10–20% of a lifer parole hear-
ing asking questions about rehabilitative programs that a prisoner has par-
ticipated in. When the parole board decides to deny parole, it often cites 
lack of participation in rehabilitation programs as among the reasons for 
denial—even if the person did not have access to those programs in prison 
(Caldwell 2016: 289). In one case, the parole board denied a man who 
served decades in prison for a juvenile conviction who scored “low risk” on 
a psychological risk assessment and had a near perfect disciplinary record 
in prison (transcript on fi le with author). The board remarked that the man 
had not participated in any programs in prison, and did not appreciate his 
attitude that he wanted to simply serve out the time that he owed for his 
crime. More generally, the parole board looks fondly upon a prisoner if she 
has written book reports ( Caldwell 2016 : 289). Logistic regression analysis 
of over 700 California lifer parole hearings has shown that failure to answer 
a question about the 12 Steps of Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous (a sub-
stance abuse program offered in California prisons) signifi cantly impacts the 
likelihood of being granted parole (Young 2016: 275). It is unclear whether 
writing book reports or being able to recite the 12 Steps reduces the chance 
of committing crime upon release. But it is clear that these pieces of evidence 
show engagement with rehabilitation and with what the parole board thinks 
is “good for inmates” to do in prison. 
 Finally, the purported focus on special deterrence does not square with 
the fact that parole is granted in murder cases at a far lower rate than other 
crimes. In California, people convicted of murder have the lowest recidi-
vism rates compared to any other crime; according to the California Depart-
ment of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s most recent outcome report, only 
2.6% of people convicted of murder who were released returned to prison, 
whereas 44.6% of all people released returned to prison ( California Depart-
ment of Corrections 2016 ). The same trend holds true across the nation 
(Mehta 2016: 67). If the parole board’s concern were solely on preventing 
future crimes, one would expect people convicted of murder to have rela-
tively high rates of release on parole. But the opposite is true. Nationally, 
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parole rates for people convicted of less serious offenses (especially non-
violent offenses) are far higher than for those convicted of murder ( Mehta 
2016 : 46–7). 
 For these reasons, the California parole board does not in practice appear 
to satisfy its purported goal of making release decisions solely on the basis 
of predictions about future crime. One lesson advocates could draw from 
this practice is that more strict procedures are needed in order for the parole 
board to live up to its purported goal. For example, strict rules of evidence 
could be implemented to specify what counts as relevant, reliable evidence 
for measuring the risk of dangerousness. The rules could preclude consid-
eration of factors (like a decades-old crime) whose relevance tends to be 
outweighed by prejudicial value. The state could train decision makers to 
focus only on the specifi ed types of reliable evidence for recidivism, and 
could engage the courts in robust judicial review of the decisions to enforce 
those rules. 
 Although such procedures are necessary and would improve the parole 
system, it is unclear whether they would actually succeed in getting parole 
board members to make decisions solely on the basis of current dangerous-
ness. Practice suggests that retributive, communicative, and rehabilitation 
concerns sincerely matter to people as they make these decisions. It may be 
psychologically unrealistic to expect people to weed out values that matter 
to them in the context of such high-stakes decisions. A better way forward 
may be to design parole-release decision making in a way that recognizes a 
variety of considerations in a structured fashion, rather than asking decision 
makers to contort their vision into seeing through a single lens. 
 Moreover, even if improved procedures could make parole decisions turn 
solely on the criterion of dangerousness, the system would remain unjust in 
light of the two objections articulated above: the looseness of “dangerous-
ness” invites arbitrary decision making, and continued incarceration based 
on predictions of future conduct fails to respect the moral agency of people 
in prison. Furthermore, an additional injustice also arises given that the sys-
tem is operating upon non-ideal social conditions. Many, if not most, people 
serving life sentences in California have endured deep injustice and trauma 
in their lives that affected their commission of the crime. In a sample of 
107 people serving life sentences for juvenile convictions, 62% experienced 
sexual, physical, or emotional abuse prior to the crime ( Caldwell 2016 : 
276). In addition to having experienced direct abuse, people discuss having 
been homeless, having witnessed their mothers or siblings being raped or 
beaten, having been shot at or having seen friends shot at, having developed 
an addiction to drugs and alcohol at a very young age (for example, under 
10 years old), having been brought into a street gang as a teen by older 
family members, and not having received any help in school for learning 
disabilities or trauma. 
 As Duff and others have argued, such circumstances of disadvantage 
and exclusion from the community ought to have a mitigating effect on 
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punishment. Among other things, such circumstances undercut the state’s 
moral standing to make the perpetrator of crime answer for that crime ( Duff 
2001 : 186–200). In the context of a parole system ostensibly grounded in 
special deterrence, however, these circumstances are used as reasons in favor 
of  denying parole. Like many actuarial risk assessment tools, the California 
parole board explicitly deems an “unstable social history” to be predictive 
of dangerousness (California Code of Regulations., Title 15, § 2402). The 
very features that deprived a person of an equal chance in life before the 
crime are used to disadvantage them further in parole decisions. Further, 
the state stands in a position of hypocrisy when it demands that prisoners 
accept full personal responsibility for the crime and express understand-
ing of their role in the crime, while the state itself never acknowledges or 
addresses the role that it played in engendering conditions of injustice that 
underlay the crime. 
 The Reparative Approach 
 Having identifi ed some of the challenges in designing parole-release crite-
ria from a theoretical and practical perspective, I turn now to suggest a 
fundamentally different approach to parole-release decisions. The approach 
described below aims to decrease arbitrary decision making by setting clear, 
individualized criteria for each person at the  outset of the prison sentence. In 
setting specifi c, individualized criteria at the outset, the approach also aims 
to respect the agency of people in prison by providing a roadmap on which 
they can exercise their own judgment and realistically earn their way out of 
prison. Further, it takes the task of crafting substantive release criteria out 
of the hands of the state (which lacks the moral standing to do this task in 
many cases), and places this task largely in the hands of a circle of people 
directly impacted by the crime. 
 I sketch the approach below, leaving further development of it for future 
research. I call the approach a reparative approach because it is based on a 
restorative justice paradigm, but only loosely so. A restorative justice para-
digm generally rejects state-centered, punitive responses to crime in favor 
of community-centered responses that aim to repair the harm of the crime 
and rebuild broken relationships. The reparative approach incorporates ele-
ments of restorative process, but it is not strictly under the banner of restor-
ative justice because it assumes the existence of a system in which the state is 
still in the business of punishing people in prison for a period of time before 
they become eligible for release on parole. 4 I have adopted this assumption 
not on the basis of ideal theory, but because I do not think it is reasonable 
to expect that the American public will take imprisonment off the table in 
the foreseeable future, at least not for grave crimes like murder and rape. 
 The reparative approach would apply in cases where a person is serving a 
prison sentence that includes the possibility of release. The approach would 
begin by convening a restorative justice circle at the outset of that sentence. 
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As Johanna Luttrell describes in her article in this volume, such a circle 
brings together various members of the community who are impacted by a 
problem (or crime), who talk and listen to each other about what happened, 
who express the harm and discuss what can be done to repair the harm, and 
create an individualized and specifi c reparation plan that can include harsh 
punishment among other things. In this context, the circle would include the 
person who committed the crime, her friends or family, the victim and/or 
friends or family of the victim (the victim and people close to the victim may 
choose not to participate, and if so, a surrogate could participate instead), 
the friends or family of the victim, and representatives from the neighbor-
hood where the perpetrator lived, where the victim lived, and where the 
crime happened. The circle would also include people who worked for the 
state and who had an infl uence on either the perpetrator or the victim—for 
example, a social worker, a teacher, a parole or probation offi cer, and staff 
at the prison where the person will be incarcerated. The circle would discuss 
the full depth of the harm of the crime, as well as any unjust disadvantages 
that the perpetrator or the victim faced prior to the crime. 
 After discussing the full extent of the harm, the circle would articulate two 
sets of goals for repairing the harm: (1) criteria that the perpetrator must 
meet in order to repair the harm, and (2) criteria that the community ought 
to work toward in order to repair the harm of the crime and any underlying 
conditions of injustice. For example, the community could be asked to pro-
vide the victim with individual therapy, and with an opportunity to partici-
pate in a carefully mediated victim-offender dialogue. A perpetrator could 
be asked to work a job in the prison to pay for those services, and to partici-
pate in programs such as substance abuse treatment, trauma-based counsel-
ing, and educational and/or vocational training. If the circle discovers that 
the perpetrator suffered abuse or other forms of disadvantage that affected 
the crime, the community could also be asked to conduct an investigation 
of the perpetrator’s background and work toward ameliorating remaining 
conditions of injustice. For example, if the circle discovers that the perpetra-
tor was sexually abused at a foster home, they could order an investigation 
into that foster home (or others in the area) to determine whether other 
children are being abused. 
 Critically, the criteria would be established at the outset of a person’s 
sentence. Setting forth individualized criteria at the outset expresses that 
the perpetrator is a  responsible agent capable of making choices for her-
self in the prison and acting on those choices. Once the criteria are clearly 
established and she knows what they are, it is  up to her to fulfi ll them and 
so in some sense “earn” her way out of prison. Further it is not “the state” 
or its representative that would establish the criteria—as Duff has argued, 
the state lacks standing to hold the perpetrator accountable in cases where 
marked disadvantage and exclusion underlie the crime ( Duff 2001 ). Instead, 
the people who are impacted by the crime create the terms of what it is to 
appropriately hold the perpetrator accountable. They set the standards, and 
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the state acts as a mediator (of sorts) to monitor compliance with those 
standards. Although the state may lack moral standing to substantively craft 
and impose the standards, no such standing is needed to engage in the task 
of monitoring compliance with those standards. (The solution is imperfect 
because the state is still engaging in the punishment of incarceration for the 
years prior to the parole hearing, and in some cases the state may lack the 
moral standing to impose this punishment.) 
 Ideally, the prison sentence would come to be understood as a structured 
opportunity for the offender to work toward repairing the harm of the 
crime and for the community to work toward repairing underlying injustice 
that surrounded the crime. The period would be complete—and thus release 
on parole would be warranted—when the offender has served a minimum 
number of years required by the judge at sentencing and has completed 
the clear, individualized criteria that are set forth by those impacted by the 
crime. In order to reduce subjective judgments on the part of the parole 
board, the criteria would be specifi c and include a clear metric for measur-
ing fulfi llment of the criteria. For example, a criterion such as “the perpetra-
tor should address trauma underlying the crime” would be too vague, but 
“the perpetrator must complete a minimum of 10 sessions of trauma-based 
counseling that focus on his history of being sexually abused.” So long 
as criteria are specifi c and measurable, the parole-release decision would 
become a fairly ministerial task of measuring completion of those criteria 
based on established metrics. 
 The criteria that the restorative circle would establish would need to be 
reasonably achievable by the perpetrator during the minimum period of 
punishment. What counts as reasonably achievable will vary from person to 
person based on individual capacities. For example, earning a college degree 
and multiple vocational certifi cations is not reasonably within the reach of a 
person who has severe cognitive impairments. In addition, the criteria must 
be achievable with respect to the conditions of imprisonment. A representa-
tive of prison administration ought to be part of the circle to inform this 
discussion, and an independent body would likely be needed to ensure that 
the prison follows through on its commitments. (This is no small task given 
the current level of resources devoted to programming in prisons: accord-
ing to a study of state parole boards, 44 require rehabilitation programs for 
release, but only two report having enough programs ( Ghandnoosh 2017 : 
32).) After the circle decides on proposed criteria, a judge would need to 
determine whether the criteria are suffi ciently specifi c, and that they are 
reasonably achievable from the perspective of both individual and institu-
tional capacities. If the criteria fail on any of these fronts, the circle would 
be reconvened to propose an alternative plan. In addition to setting initial 
criteria, procedures may be developed to assess progress at various intervals 
during the period of incarceration and to allow for a small number of modi-
fi cations to the criteria based on unanticipated developments. 
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 A thorough description and defense of the reparative approach is beyond 
the scope of this paper. It may be that suffi ciently specifi c criteria are too 
diffi cult to agree upon in the context of grave crimes. It may also be implau-
sible to enforce commitments that the prison provide programs that are 
necessary to meet the criteria. These are just some of the issues that require 
further research. But given the problems with existing parole-release sys-
tems and the pressing need to reform these systems, there is no better time 
to conduct this further research into a fundamentally different approach. 
 Notes 
 1  While I have changed the name of this person to protect his identity, all other cited 
facts about this case are true. 
 2  I thank Gideon Yaffe for calling my attention to the complexity of this question. 
 3  Theorists disagree on whether communication plays a central role in the moral 
justifi cation of punishment. Duff, for example, maintains that the communicative 
aim of punishment grounds the very legitimacy of a system of crimes and punish-
ments. On the other end of the spectrum, Victor Tadros argues that while the com-
municative aim of punishment is morally signifi cant in considering how we ought 
to tailor punishments, it plays a cursory role (at best) in justifying the existence of 
a system of criminal punishment (Tadros 2011: 99–110). 
 4  I am drawing here on a distinction between restorative process (victim-offender 
mediation, sentencing circles, family-group conferences) and restorative justice 
(paradigm of not seeking to complement the criminal justice system but to replace 
it) (Robinson 2011: 353–5). 
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